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Abstract 
The crisis that broke out in mid-2007 was caused by the fact that the CDO market had grown 
to a size sufficient to wreak general havoc when it suddenly collapsed. Several authors have 
argued that economic inequality was important to the growth of this market. This paper 
attempts to strengthen this argument by concentrating attention on global wealth 
concentration. After summarising recent evidence on the negative impact of investor demand 
on US bond yields in the pre-crisis period, new evidence regarding the specific contribution 
of high net worth individuals to this negative impact is presented. The paper then goes on to 
show how, after having helped to caused a yield problem in the major US debt markets, high 
net worth individuals (via hedge funds) continued to be a major source of the pressure on US 
banks to resolve this yield problem through the mass production of CDOs.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the unresolved questions arising out of the subprime crisis of 2007 concerns the 
precise role played by income and wealth inequality. That this issue had to figure somewhere 
in the crisis is not in doubt considering that many of those who took out the subprime loans 
belonged to the poorest sections of the American population (see e.g. Fernandez et al., 2008; 
Wade, 2009; Palma, 2009; Stockhammer, 2009). What is in doubt is whether economic 
inequality had a more centrally causal role, for although poverty can explain the demand for 
mortgage loans it cannot explain why these loans were securitised and then re-securitised into 
the collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) that were sold to investors. This shortfall in 
explanatory power helps to explain the observed asymmetry in the discussions of the 
subprime crisis: while those seeking to give importance to the role of inequality feel bound to 
also give prominence to the failures in the banking sector, the reverse is not true in that those 
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who prioritise the part played by these institutional failures do not also feel bound to include 
the part played by inequality (see e.g. Brummer (2009) who emphasises the importance of 
greed on the part of the banks; Davies (2010) who highlights the lack of regulation; Trichet 
(2008) and IMF (2008) who blame the widespread undervaluation of risk, and Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2009) who identify global imbalances and low short-term interest rates as important 
codeterminants). 
It has been argued (Lysandrou, 2011a) that the only way to redress this imbalance is to 
bring both ends of the wealth distribution spectrum into the story behind the growth of 
CDOs: just as low incomes and poverty in the US were among the ‘supply-push’ factors in 
this growth inasmuch as mortgage loans constituted the raw material for CDOs, so was 
wealth concentration one of the ‘demand-pull’ factors inasmuch as it was a major source of 
the pressure on the banks to satisfy investors’ reach for yield. We agree fully with this 
argument but also point out that more work needs to be done to give it weight. Three hurdles 
in particular need to be overcome. The first concerns the demand for traditional US debt 
securities: to give credibility to the claim that the production of CDOs was rapidly expanded 
between 2002 and 2007 chiefly in order to absorb the overspill of demand for yield flowing 
from the other US debt markets it has to be shown that the unusually low yields in these other 
markets over this same period was in large part caused by the pressure from investors. The 
second hurdle concerns the contribution of rich individuals to the downward pressure on 
bond yields: this contribution needs to be separated out from the various other sources of US 
bond demand and quantified if the concentration of private wealth ownership is to be shown 
to have been a major driver behind the growth of CDOs. The third hurdle concerns the 
unusual structure of the CDO market: as rich individuals along with certain other types of 
customer would have been excluded from this market due to the highly complex nature of 
CDOs the claim that the banks were under pressure to create these products can only hold up 
if there is a clear explanation as to exactly how that pressure was transmitted. Some progress 
appears to have been made with regard to overcoming the first and third of these hurdles and 
we shall review this progress below. As far as we are aware, however, no attempt has yet 
been made to overcome the middle hurdle. The chief contribution of this paper is to take up 
this task. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two reviews some recent evidence on the 
impact of US bond demand on US bond yields in the pre-crisis period. Section three presents 
new evidence on the impact of high net worth individuals (HNWIs) on US bond yields. 
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Section four specifies why US income inequality and global wealth concentration provided 
the all encompassing framework for the mass production of CDOs. Section five concludes. 
 
2. The impact of investor demand on US bond yields 
The estimated amount of CDOs in 2002 was about US$0.25 trillion and yet by the time 
these products triggered the financial crisis in mid-2007 that figure had multiplied twelvefold 
to about US$3 trillion (Blundell-Wignall, 2007). This rapid growth closely correlated with 
some other unusual developments in the US financial system over this period. One was the 
persistently low nominal long-term yields in all of the major US bond markets, a 
development that eventually gave rise to a much discussed bond yield ‘conundrum’ after June 
2004 as long term yields continued to remain low even as the Federal Funds rate began to rise 
sharply from this date (see Figure 1)1. The other was the steep increase in the volumes of 
private domestic investor demand and more importantly of foreign inflows into the US bond 
market (see Figure 2), the latter now appearing to have been due not only to inflows from 
Asian and other emerging market economies but also to inflows from Western European 
economies (albeit that in their case leverage rather than oil or non-oil export surpluses were 
the major source of funds (Bernanke et al., 2011)).  
 
Figure 1.  Long and short-term interest rates in the US 
Note: The left plot compares the 3-month Eurodollar rate with the nominal 10-year Treasury yield. The right 
plot demonstrates the downward movement of traditional long-term bond yields in the US (Sources: 
Bloomberg, 2010; FR Statistical Release H.15, 2010). 
                                                
1 As Alan Greenspan, the then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, stated before Congress in June 2005: “Among 
the biggest surprises of the past year has been the pronounced decline in long-term interest rates on U.S. 
Treasury securities despite a 2-percentage-point increase in the federal funds rate. This is clearly without recent 
precedent. … Moreover, even after the recent backup in credit risk spreads, yields for … corporate bonds have 
declined even more than Treasuries over the same period.” (Greenspan, 2005, p.1).  
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Figure 2.  US bond holdings from foreign and private domestic investors 
Note: The plots respectively show the US bond holdings of foreign governments (top left), foreign private 
investors (top right) and domestic private investors (bottom) (Sources: FR Statistical Release Z.1, 2010; TIC, 
2010). 
There are basically two views regarding the correlation between US bond yields and CDO 
growth. The majority view is that there is no deeper causal link behind this correlation: yields 
in the traditional US debt markets may have been unusually low in the immediate pre-crisis 
period and so investors would have been happy to accept the higher yielding CDOs2, but this 
admission aside, the general belief continues to be that greed, overconfidence and other 
failings on the part of the banks and their associates were the more important motivating 
forces behind the rapid acceleration in CDO production prior to mid-2007. A number of 
authors (see e.g. Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Gros, 2009; Lysandrou, 2009; 
Caballero, 2010; Bernanke et al. 2011) have advanced the contrary view that there was in fact 
a line of causality running from the pressure of aggregate foreign and domestic demand on 
yields in the traditional US bond markets through to the CDO market but this has remained to 
date a minority view. 
The most likely explanation for this state of affairs is that there has been relatively little 
work done to quantify the impact of aggregate investor demand on US bond yields in the pre-
                                                
2 As Coval et al. (2009, p.4) state, by  “offering AAA-ratings along with attractive yields during a period of 
relatively low interest rates, these products were eagerly bought up by investors around the world.”  
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crisis period. It is true that in response to the post-2004 bond yield ‘conundrum’ a number of 
studies investigated the impact of demand on US Treasury yields and found that impact to 
have been significantly negative (e.g. Idier et al., 2007; Bandholz et al., 2009; Craine and 
Martin, 2009; Warnock and Cacdac Warnock, 2009). However, while these results represent 
a necessary first step towards vindicating the demand-pull version of the CDO growth story 
they are not sufficient. CDOs are in the end ‘second-floor’ debt securities, securities backed 
by securities. Thus if credibility is to be given to the claim that the US CDO market was 
expanded just prior to 2007 chiefly in order to take the overspill of demand for yield flowing 
from the other US debt markets it has to be shown that investors had a significant negative 
impact not only on the Treasury yield but also on the yields in the other ‘ground floor’ 
markets (those for corporate and municipal debt securities) and also on the yield in the ‘first 
floor’ market (that for agency debt securities). Evidence to this effect has been recently 
provided by Goda et al. (2011) using autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) based 
econometric models. Some details regarding their choice of modelling procedure and the data 
that were used are given in the appendix. Here we briefly present their main findings 
regarding the marginal cumulative impact (MCI) of investor demand on US bond yields 
during the ‘conundrum’ period3. 
Treasury yield 
The results of the Treasury model show that the increase in the holdings ratio4 of foreign 
governments had a negative impact on the 10-year Treasuries yield in the short-run and in the 
long-run (see Appendix, Table A1). Thus, the increase in their holdings ratio (from 32.4% to 
42%) depressed the yield by as much as 60 bp during the ‘conundrum’ period, as shown in 
Figure 3a. This finding is similar to that reported in previous studies. By contrast, foreign 
private investors had no discernible impact on the Treasury yield in this period (see Figure 
3b). 
                                                
3 The MCI is the variable’s contribution to the yield relative to a chosen reference point, in this case May 2004. 
The MCI depends on the changes in the holdings ratios and on the respective coefficients of the differenced and 
lagged level demand variables. The formula for calculating each month’s MCI is: 
ܫ݉݌ܽܿݐఊ௧ ൌ ߚఊଵ∆ߛ௧ ൅ ߚఊଵ௦௛௜௙௧∆ߛ௧ ൅ ⋯൅ ߚఊଵଶ∆ߛ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߚఊଵଶ௦௛௜௙௧∆ߛ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߚఊଵଷߛ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚఊଵଷ௦௛௜௙௧ߛ௧ିଵ (1) 
ܯܥܫఊ௧ ൌ ܫ݉݌ܽܿݐఊ௧ െ ܫ݉݌ܽܿݐఊଶ଴଴ସ:଴ହ (2) 
4 The holdings ratio (i.e. the amount of holdings divided by the outstanding amount of bonds) “is preferable to 
mere flow or stock figures because demand pressure can be expected to take place only when investors increase 
their holdings disproportionally to newly available bonds (i.e. if their holdings ratio increases).” (Goda et al., 
2011, p.11). 
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Figure 3.  Variables’ MCIs for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield (in % points) 
Note: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of the demand variables on the nominal 10-year 
Treasury yield for each month during the ‘conundrum’ period according to the results of the Treasury yield 
model (see Appendix, Table A1). 
Agency bond yield 
Foreign official demand also had a significant negative impact on the 10-year agency bond 
yield in the short-run and in the long-run (see Appendix, Table A2 and Table A3, column 1). 
As shown in Figure 4a, the increase in the foreign official holdings ratio depressed the yield 
by as much as 107 bp during the ‘conundrum’ period. Other sources of demand also had a 
negative, albeit smaller, impact on the agency yield in this period. As shown in Figures 4b-
4d, private foreigners, US individuals, and US pension funds helped to reduce the long-term 
agency bond yield by as much as 39 bp, 17 bp, and 11 bp respectively. 
Corporate bond yield 
Between 1994 and mid-2007 foreign private investors invested heavily in the AAA-rated 
corporate bond market (their holdings ratio more than doubling, from 11% to 24.5%) with the 
result that they put significant downward pressure on corporate bond yields in the short-run 
and long-run (see Appendix, Table A2 and Table A3). As shown in Figure 5a, between June 
2004 and June 2007 the AAA-rated corporate bond yield was lowered by as much as 69 bp 
by foreign private investors’ demand pressure. US individual investors and banks also had 
some negative impact in the short-run when they increased their holdings ratio (see 
Appendix, Table A2); as shown in Figures 5b and 5c, they respectively decreased the yield 
by as much as 12 bp and 13 bp in the ‘conundrum’ period.  
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Figure 4.  Variables’ MCIs for the nominal 10-year agency bond yield (in % points) 
Note: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of the demand variables on the nominal 10-year 
agency bond yield for each month during the ‘conundrum’ period according to the results of the agency yield 
model (see Appendix, Table A2). 
 
Figure 5.  Variables’ MCIs for the nominal AAA-rated corporate bond yield (in % points) 
Note: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of the demand variables on the nominal AAA-rated 
corporate bond yield for each month during the ‘conundrum’ period according to the results of the corporate 
yield model (see Appendix, Table A2). 
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Municipal bond yield 
Although the increase in foreign holdings of municipal bonds was relatively modest 
during the ‘conundrum’ period, their increasing holdings ratio had a negative impact on the 
yields of AAA-rated 10-year municipal bonds (see Appendix, Table A2 and Table A3). As 
shown in Figure 6a, foreign investors helped to lower the yield by as much as 31 bp in the 
‘conundrum’ period. Although the MCI of foreign investors was higher than the MCIs of 
domestic individual investors, banks and insurance companies (see Figures 6b-6d), domestic 
investors as a group lowered the municipal bond yield in this period by as much as 34 bp. 
The relatively strong market reaction to the small increase in the foreign holdings ratio can be 
probably explained by the fact that the entry of this new market player reduced investment 
opportunities that the big domestic market players would have liked to have retained for 
themselves. 
 
Figure 6.  Variables’ MCIs for the nominal AAA-rated municipal bond yield (in % points) 
Note: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of the demand variables on the nominal10-year  
AAA-rated municipal bond yield for each month during the ‘conundrum’ period according to the results of 
the municipal  yield model (see Appendix, Table A2). 
In sum, the results from Goda et al. (2011) appear to give solid empirical support to the 
claim that aggregate investor demand was a major source of the downward pressure on US 
bond yields in the pre-subprime crisis period. In particular, they show that foreign official 
investors had a major suppressing effect on yields in the Treasury and agency bond markets 
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and that foreign and domestic private investors had a similar effect in the corporate and 
municipal bond markets. This latter observation raises the question as to how significant a 
proportion of this private sector pressure on yields stemmed from an important subgroup of 
this sector, namely that comprising of the world’s high net worth individuals. The next 
section tries to answer this question. 
 
3. The impact of HNWIs on US bond yields 
According to Capgemini and Merrill Lynch (2008) the number of HNWIs – individuals 
with net assets in excess of US$1 million (excluding primary residences) – was around 10 
million in 2007, a figure that represented just 0.15% of the world’s population of 6.6 billion. 
The supposition that these individuals could have had any significant impact in the US bond 
markets in the pre-subprime crisis era may seem incredible when one considers how 
vanishingly small in number they were but not when one considers the amounts of wealth 
they concentrated in their hands and the forms in which this wealth was stored. As shown in 
Figure 7a, in 2007 the world’s HNWIs had approximately US$ 41 trillion in assets (world 
GDP in that year was US$55 trillion) as compared with approximately US$25 trillion in 
20005, which is to say that prior to the crisis HNWIs were the biggest global investor group 
with more assets under management than global pension funds (US$ 28 trillion), mutual 
funds (US$ 26 trillion) and insurance companies (US$ 20 trillion) (IFSL, 2008a)6. As can be 
seen in Figure 7b, financial securities represented one of the dominant forms in which 
HNWIs stored their wealth, accounting for an average of 54% for the whole period from 
2002 to 2007. 
                                                
5 In the two decades prior to the subprime crisis there was a six fold increase in HNWI wealth – from US$ 7 
trillion in 1986 (Haseler, 2000) to US$ 41 trillion in 2007 – while there was only a four fold increase in world 
GDP over the same period (WDI, 2011). 
6 It should be noted that even these figures understate the degree of wealth concentration as exemplified by the 
fact that of the US$ 41 trillion figure for 2007 US$ 15 trillion worth of assets, or 37% of the total, was held by 
100,000 ‘ultra-HNWIs’ with net assets in excess of US$ 30 million (Capgemini and Merrill Lynch, 2008), while 
a sizeable proportion of this amount, US$ 2.6 trillion, was held by an even smaller group of 793 billionaires, 
half of whose number were US citizens (IFSL, 2007). 
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Figure 7. HNWIs assets under management, by region and by asset class (in US$ tr) 
Source: Capgemini and Merrill Lynch World Wealth Reports (2003-2008) 
Given that HNWI asset allocation to debt securities accounted for US$ 11 trillion in 2007 
(roughly 14% of the total global stock of debt securities in that year) and that private investor 
demand influenced US bond yields, it is clear that HNWIs had to have had an impact on 
AAA-rated US bond yields. Although there is no precise information about the degree of 
HNWI involvement in the US bond markets in the immediate pre-2007 period, some 
approximate estimates of that involvement can be extracted from the known HNWI 
investment figures. As concerns the estimate for US HNWI holdings of US bonds, these are 
derived in two steps: (i) we know the amount of assets held by North American HNWIs (see 
Figure 7a) and we know from Credit Suisse (2010, p. 82) that “...residents of the USA 
account for about 90% of the [HNWI population] figure for Northern America”; multiplying 
the resulting amount of US HNWIs wealth with the average global HNWI investment share 
in fixed income securities during this time (i.e. 23%) gives us the totals for US HNWIs global 
bond investments as listed in column 1 of Table 1; (ii) we know from Capgemini and Merrill 
Lynch (2006) that about 78% of US HNWI portfolio holdings are invested domestically, so 
we apply this ratio to the total US HNWI global bond investments to derive the approximate 
figures for US HNWI holdings of US bonds that are listed in column 2 of Table 1. These 
figures on average represent about 58% of all US individual investments in US bonds 
according to the Flow of Funds data presented in column 3 of Table 17. The application of 
this 58% ratio to the Flow of Funds data on US individual holdings in each bond class 
enables us to derive the equivalent estimated US HNWI holdings of Treasury, agency, 
corporate and municipal bonds, as listed in Table 2. 
                                                
7 This percentage seems very reasonable given that in the US the “ownership of any type of bond is concentrated 
among the highest tiers of the income and wealth distributions” (Bucks et al., 2009, p. A22) 
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Table 1. Estimated bond holdings of US HNWIs (in US$ tr) 
 
Source: own estimates; column 3 Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1. (2010) data 
Table 2. Estimated US bond holdings of US HNWIs sub-divided by bond type (in US$ bn) 
 
Source: own estimates derived from Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1. (2010) data 
To calculate the rest of the world (ROW) HNWI US bond holdings some assumptions are 
again necessary. The first is that the total amount of fixed income holdings of ROW HNWIs 
is equal to total HNWI fixed income investment minus the amount of US HNWI global bond 
investment, see Table 3. The second assumption is that ROW HNWIs invested around 30% 
of their fixed income investment in foreign markets; according to data from Fidora et al. 
(2006) non-US investors on average placed around 70% of their investment in their home 
market. The third assumption is that ROW HNWIs investments in foreign bond markets are 
allocated according to their respective market sizes; thus multiplying ROW HNWI foreign 
bond holdings by the global market share of the US debt security market gives us the 
estimated amounts of ROW HNWI US bond holdings (see Table 4). 
Table 3. Estimated global bond holdings of ROW HNWIs (in US$ tr) 
 
Source: own estimates derived from Capgemini and Merrill Lynch (2006, 2008) data 
US HNWIs global
bond  investment
US HNWIs invest-
ment in US bonds
US individual invest-
ment in US bonds
Jun-04 1.93 1.50 2.48
Jun-05 2.11 1.65 2.82
Jun-06 2.34 1.82 3.24
Jun-07 2.42 1.89 3.35
Jun-04
Jun-05
Jun-06
Jun-07
691
844
908
420
460
502
530
US Treasuries US agency bonds US corporate and 
foreign bonds
US municipal 
bonds
238
238
316
202
176
247
215
305
604
HNWIs investment in 
fixed income
US HNWIs global bond 
investment
Investment of ROW 
HNWIs in bonds
Jun-04 7.37 1.93 5.44
Jun-05 7.01 2.11 4.90
Jun-06 7.81 2.34 5.47
Jun-07 10.99 2.42 8.57
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Table 4. Estimated US bond holdings of ROW HNWIs (in US$ tr) 
 
Source: own estimates; column 2 data are derived from IMF Global Financial Stability Reports (2004-2008) 
It is unlikely that the holdings of ROW HNWIs were split evenly between Treasury, 
agency, corporate and municipal bonds. Therefore, one last assumption is necessary to get an 
idea about the size of ROW HNWIs holdings in the different US bond markets. It is known 
that a significant amount of wealth from HNWIs is held offshore (see e.g. Tax Justice 
Network, 2005). Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the bond portfolio composition 
of ROW HNWIs is similar to the portfolio composition of foreign investors that bought 
Treasuries, agency and corporate bonds via tax havens and financial centres8. Furthermore, it 
can be assumed that a significant part of foreign municipal bond holdings (around one third) 
is held by HNWIs as these bonds are particular attractive for individuals due to their tax 
status9. The resulting estimates of ROW HNWIs US bond holdings according to bond type 
are given in Table 5.  
Table 5. Estimated US bond holdings of ROW HNWIs sub-divided by bond type (in US$ bn) 
 
Source: own estimates derived from Global Financial Stability Report (2004-2008) data 
Summing across the estimated holdings of US bonds by US HNWIs and ROW HNWIs for 
the period 2004 to 2007, see Table 6, two distinct patterns become clear. The first is that 
HNWIs, along with other private sector investors, appear to have been partially squeezed out 
                                                
8 Data regarding foreign private investors’ use of tax havens and financial centres to invest in US Treasuries and 
in agency and corporate bonds are available from the Treasury International Capital System (TIC). Municipal 
bonds are not included in the TIC data (probably because only a relatively small amount is held by foreigners). 
9 The interest income of most municipal bonds is exempted from state and local taxes. Thus, the share of US 
individuals in total municipal bond holdings (around 36% in the conundrum period) was higher than in other 
bond classes. 
ROW HNWIs invest-
ment in foreign bonds
US debt securities / 
world total
ROW HNWIs invest-
ment in US bonds
Jun-04 1.63 39% 0.63
Jun-05 1.47 40% 0.59
Jun-06 1.64 39% 0.64
Jun-07 2.57 37% 0.96
Jun-04
Jun-05
Jun-06
Jun-07 123 105 721 13
97 87 402 9
106 84 439 10
US Treasuries US agency bonds US corporate and 
foreign bonds
US municipal 
bonds
124 96 407 8
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of the US Treasury market as a result of the steep increase in the foreign official holdings of 
Treasuries. The second is that HNWIs, again in common with other private sector investors, 
reacted to the partial squeeze out of Treasuries by shifting substantial amounts of funds into 
the other major US bond markets. 
Table 6. Estimated holdings of all HNWIs in the US bond market 
 
 
According to the models of Goda et al. (2011), private foreign and US individual investors 
put pressure on AAA-rated bond yields if they increased their holdings to a greater extent 
than the increase in the outstanding amount of these bonds. The same must be true for 
HNWIs because they are an important subgroup of private foreign and US individual 
investors as our estimates have shown. To obtain estimates for the impact of HNWIs on US 
long-term bond yields for the period June 2004 to June 2007 we therefore use the data 
contained in Table 2 and Table 5 and the MCIs of private foreign and individual investors. To 
be more precise, we first calculate the share of US HNWIs in total US individual holdings 
and the share of ROW HNWIs in total foreign private holdings for each bond class and then 
multiply these shares with the respective MCIs of US individual investors and foreign private 
investors (see Figures 3 – 6) to obtain the MCIs of US and ROW HNWIs in each bond class; 
we finally sum these monthly MCIs of US and ROW HNWIs to obtain the total estimated 
impact of all HNWIs in each bond class. These MCIs reveal that, as expected, HNWIs had no 
discernible impact on the Treasury yield (Figure 8a), while they did have a significant 
negative impact on the long-term yields of agency bonds (by as much as 15 bp, Figure 8b), of 
AAA-rated corporate bonds (by a maximum of 18 bp, Figure 8c) and of AAA-rated 
municipal bonds (by as much as 12 bp, Figure 8d). Generally speaking, HNWIs seem to have 
depressed US long-term bond yields to a similar degree as changes in business cycle 
expectations, interest rate volatility and default risk (see Goda et al., 2011). 
Jun-04
Jun-05
Jun-06
Jun-07 2,907
334
299
411
US Treasuries
362
335
423
325 1,629 542
total HNWIs invest-
ment in US bonds
US agency bonds US corporate and 
foreign bonds
US municipal 
bonds
2,073 272 1,011 428
2,231 1,093 469
2,516 1,283 512
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Figure 8. Estimated impact of HNWIs demand on AAA-rated long-term yields (in % points) 
Note: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of HNWIs according to the sum of the shares of US 
HNWIS in US individual holdings and ROW HNWIs in foreign private holdings and the MCIs of US 
individual investors and foreign private investors (see Figures 3-6). 
To summarise, apart from US Treasuries, HNWIs did have a consistently negative impact 
on US bond yields in the pre-crisis period according to our estimations. These are, we repeat, 
rough approximations. However, we believe that, while not totally accurate, these estimations 
are sufficiently accurate as to validate our HNWI ‘blocking’ hypothesis: namely, that in the 
pre-crisis period this small group of individuals occupied enough space in the US bond 
markets as to prevent them from being able to fully accommodate the demand pressure for 
debt securities stemming from other investor groups, a development that in turn meant that 
the CDO market had to be rapidly expanded in this period in order to absorb the excess 
pressure. The precise mechanism through which the pressure for yield was transmitted to 
those institutions that created the CDOs is explained in the next section. 
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4. Income inequality, wealth concentration and the mass production of CDOs 
CDOs had been in existence for about two decades prior to 2002 but it was only from 
about this time that these products began to be produced on a mass scale10. This development 
had to have had some connection with the increase in US income inequality for obvious 
reasons. As most CDOs were comprised of securitised conforming and nonconforming 
(including subprime) household loans there had to be a rise in overall US household debt 
levels and this criterion was certainly met in the pre-2007 era. The debt to income ratios of 
the bottom 95% of the US population in terms of income distribution increased from around 
70% in the mid-1980s to around 140% in 2007, while the debt to income ratios of the richest 
5% of the US population stayed relatively constant at around 70% (Kumhof and Ranciere, 
2010). Although the rapid expansion of loans to the US household sector was certainly 
facilitated by the use of various enticements and by the progressive reduction in lending 
standards, the deeper material precondition for this rapid expansion had to be a steep rise in 
inequality and this criterion was also met. While the richest 1% of the US population 
increased their income share from roughly 9% in 1980 to 23% in 2006 (Palma, 2009) the 
bottom 40% of the population lost around 4% of their income share in the same period, 
ending up with approximately 14% in 2007 (Palma, 2011)11.  
The catch, as previously noted, is that while it is easy to bring inequality into the CDO 
growth story in an enabling role it is far more difficult to give it a more centrally causal role: 
an increase in income inequality can explain the demand for loans (see e.g. Horn et al., 2009; 
UN, 2009; Ezuho, 2011; Onaran et al., 2011) but not the reasons why these loans were 
securitised and then resecuritised to form CDOs. To make good this explanatory shortfall it is 
necessary to direct attention as much to those at the rich end of the distribution spectrum as to 
those at the poor end: just as individuals on low incomes face the problem of how to make 
ends meet and have to rely on credit to help alleviate this problem so the very rich individuals 
face the opposite of problem of how to store their vast sums of wealth and have to rely on 
                                                
10 In his testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), Charles Prince (ex Citigroup CEO) stated  
that “Securitization could be seen as a factory line … As more and more and more of these subprime mortgages 
were created as raw material for the securitization process” (2011, p.102); while David Sambol, the President 
and CEO of Countrywide (the largest mortgage originator in the US) admitted that in the run up to the subprime 
crisis the chief business purpose of his company was to be a “seller of securities to Wall Street … originating 
what was salable in the secondary market.”, a point exemplified by the fact that it “sold or securitized 87% of 
the $1.5 trillion in mortgages it originated between 2002 and 2005” (p.105). 
11 Although this polarisation gathered momentum during Clinton’s presidency as “the top 1% of income earners 
captured 45% of the total growth in (pre-tax) income” it accelerated even more rapidly during Bush’s first term 
of office as during this period “no less than 73% of total income growth accrued to the top 1%” (Palma, 2009, p. 
842). 
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financial securities, including corporate and government bonds, to help resolve this problem. 
The key point here is to view debt securities not merely as forms of debt but as commodities 
whose use value to investors, including HNWIs, is to serve as stores of value. This point is 
missing in Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) and Milanovic (2011, pp. 193-197) who have 
observed that a further reason why the rising polarisation lead to an increase in bank lending 
to poor households is that rich households needed to recycle their surplus income. While we 
accept this observation, it leaves out the possibility that HNWIs, after having exerted a 
negative impact on yields in the traditional US bond markets, were then involved in some 
way in the promotion of CDOs as the means of resolving the low yield problem. 
However, even this line of argument comes up against a major difficulty in that HNWIs 
simply did not have the requisite expertise or knowledge to be directly involved in the CDO 
market. Indeed, the complexity and opacity of these structured credit products was such as to 
prevent the development of a broad customer base similar to that in other financial markets, a 
fact which helps to explain why so many commentators on the subprime crisis believe that 
the rapid growth in CDO issuance before 2007 could not have been due to the pull of investor 
demand but that, on the contrary, it must have been powered by the issuing banks themselves. 
Of course, the inevitable corollary of giving supply push factors primacy in the CDO growth 
story is that economic inequality either drops out of this story altogether or only enters it 
merely as something that the banks were able to exploit in the course of advancing their own 
material interests. It has been argued that the only way to set the record straight regarding the 
role of investor demand in the CDO production system prior to the crisis is to direct attention 
to the hedge funds (Lysandrou, 2011b). 
The acceleration in CDO production between 2002 and 2007 appears to have been very 
closely paralleled by an acceleration in the growth of the hedge fund industry. As shown in 
Figure 9a, hedge fund assets more than tripled between 2002 and 2007, rising from US$600 
billion to about US$2.2 trillion, while the number of firms operating within the industry 
nearly doubled in this period. The two drivers behind the growth of the hedge fund industry 
were the increasing amounts of wealth of HNWIs, which was partly channelled into hedge 
funds, and the ‘institutionalisation’ of the hedge funds’ client base. Institutional investments 
in hedge funds remained comparatively modest up to 2002 but after that date these 
investments rose rapidly (see Figure 9b), a likely motivating factor being their search for 
yield. Although CDOs offered what seemed a good and direct solution to the yield problem 
that was becoming increasingly acute due to the low long-term yields in the traditional US 
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bond markets, the high risk and difficult to trade nature of these structured credit products 
meant that the pension and mutual funds and various other institutional investors had to limit 
their direct involvement with them and look for additional solutions to the yield problem. 
This included the placement of large sums with the hedge funds, which, not being subject to 
the same regulatory and prudential constraints that were binding on the public investment 
funds used a substantial proportion of these sums to buy vast amounts of CDOs. Just how 
vast is shown in Table 7 that gives the June 2007 breakdown of CDO holdings by type of 
institution: hedge funds were by the far the biggest single group of investors in CDOs, 
holding nearly a half of all these products (around US$ 1.4 trillion), a figure that appears all 
the more striking considering that at that same time hedge funds’ holdings of ordinary 
financial securities amounted to no more than 1-2% of the world’s total.  
  
Figure 9.  Hedge Funds: number, assets under management, and source of capital 
Source: IFSL (2008a)  
 
Table 7.  Holdings of CDO buyers by June 2007 
 
Source: Blundell-Wignall (2007) 
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In view of the opaque and highly illiquid nature of CDOs the question arises as to why 
hedge funds, which were well known for being short term ‘buy and sell’ traders rather than 
long term ‘buy and hold’ investors, would choose to invest heavily in these products. The 
answer is to be found in the composition of their CDO holdings. On the one hand, hedge 
funds held significantly higher proportions of the unrated and high risk equity tranches than 
did the insurance companies and asset managers (the latter had to restrict their holdings of 
these tranches on account of prudential considerations and regulatory constraints). On the 
other hand, the hedge funds held substantial amounts of the senior tranches in large part 
because these could be used as collateral in borrowing arrangements. In common with other 
financial institutions, such as the bank operated conduits and special purpose vehicles, hedge 
funds leveraged up their exposure to CDOs, but unlike these other institutions who 
principally relied on the issuance of asset-backed commercial paper for their borrowing needs 
(see Acharya and Schnabel, 2010), the hedge funds did most of their borrowing via their 
prime brokers and used the investment grade rated CDO tranches as collateral to reduce the 
costs of this borrowing. If it is asked why the investment banks, the primary lenders of money 
to the hedge funds, were willing to accept these securities as collateral, the simple answer is 
that it was these very same banks that helped to create the CDOs in the first place. 
Once it is made clear why the hedge funds were attracted by the special properties of 
CDOs and why these properties in turn depended to a large extent on the hedge fund-
investment bank relation, the barriers to the demand-pull version of the CDO growth story 
begin to collapse. In light of the close correlation between low US bond yields and CDO 
growth in the 2002-2007 period, there has been no shortage of claims or suspicions on the 
part of academic economists and policy makers alike that the search for yield was a major 
source of pressure on the US banks to create CDOs (see King, 2007; Gros 2009; Lysandrou 
2009; Caballero 2010; Bernanke et al. 2011). Nor has there been any shortage of anecdotal 
evidence attesting to that pressure 12 . If, however, all of this has yet to undermine the 
                                                
12 For example, Mike Francis, executive director at Morgan Stanley on the residential mortgage trading desk, 
stated in an interview: “We almost couldn't produce enough to keep the appetite of our investors happy. More 
people wanted bonds than we could actually produce. That was our difficult task, was trying to produce enough. 
They would call and say, we're looking for more fixed rate. What have you got? Do you have anything coming? 
What's going on? Tell us what you're trying to do. From our standpoint it's like, there's a guy out there with a lot 
of money. And we have got to find a way to become his sole provider of bonds, of mortgage bonds, to fill his 
appetite. And his appetite's massive.” (This American Life, 2008). To be able to produce the huge quantities that 
were needed standards were lowered not only to bring more numbers of subprime borrowers into the mortgage 
market but also to speed up the whole mortgage origination process. Furthermore, it was not only poor 
households that were supplied with subprime loans; households with good credit scores were also “pushed into 
risky subprime loans [because] lenders or brokers aggressively marketed the loans, offering easier and faster 
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widespread support for the supply-push version of the CDO growth this is because there has 
been until now no clear specification of the demand pressure transmission mechanism. The 
reality is that such a mechanism did exist between 2002 and 2007, albeit that it was based not 
so much on a system of arms length and impersonal exchanges as on a dense network of 
personal relations between pairs of agents at the very heart of which was the relation between 
the hedge funds and the investment banks (see Figure 10). This relation has always been a 
particularly close one: hedge funds could not carry out their function to the extent that they 
do without the range of prime brokerage and other support services provided by the 
investment banks, while the latter could not maintain profit margins at the level that they do 
without the interests, fees and commissions that they charge the hedge funds (according to 
Mustier and Dubois (2007) about a quarter of all investment banks’ income comes from the 
hedge funds). When the problem of yield started to becomes serious from about 2002, the 
close-knit and mutually advantageous nature of the relation between the hedge funds and the 
investment banks made that relation the perfect conduit through which the demand pressure 
for yield was passed on to the creators of CDOs. Just as the hedge funds needed to plough 
substantial amounts of their clients’ money into CDOs because these helped to enhance 
returns while also helping to reduce leverage costs, so were the investment banks pressing the 
commercial banks and others into helping them to supply the hedge funds with CDOs 
because in addition to the fees and commissions earned directly from the sale of these 
products they could also expect the extra income from the extra business with hedge funds 
much of which would have been generated with the help of CDOs.. 
 
Figure 10.  Outline of the main forces in the CDO market 
                                                                                                                                                     
approvals, [this] was fuelled with faxes and emails from lenders to brokers touting easier qualification for 
borrowers and attractive payouts” (Brooks and Simon, 2007). 
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To understand the pivotal role of the investment bank-hedge fund relationship in the mass 
production of CDOs is not just to understand the importance of the demand pressure for yield 
in that mass production; it is also to understand the importance of income inequality and 
wealth concentration in providing the all-encompassing framework for the CDO production 
system, a point also illustrated in Figure 10. Consider again the role of US income inequality 
on the supply side of the production process. To create CDOs in abundance you need an 
abundant US demand for loans for which in turn you need an increasing polarisation of US 
incomes and, as we have seen, both of these preconditions were met in full. Now consider the 
role of global wealth concentration on the demand side of the CDO production process. 
Hedge funds may have been the conduit through which the demand pressure for yield was 
transmitted through to the CDO creators but the ultimate source of that pressure were the 
clients of the hedge funds, and chief amongst these clients were the worlds’ HNWIs (see 
Figure 9b). Although their percentage share of the total assets placed with hedge funds fell in 
the years preceding the financial crisis, as money flowed in from institutional investors, 
HNWIs still remained by far the largest single group of investors, accounting for around two 
thirds of hedge fund assets during the 2002 to 2007 period. Thus, the irony is that having 
helped to create the US bond yield problem by virtue of channelling sizeable proportions of 
their wealth into the US bond markets, the HNWIs then continued to be at the forefront of the 
demands made upon on the hedge funds to find ways of resolving that yield problem. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The majority of mainstream economists and government policy makers continue to believe 
that the financial crisis was caused by a wrong organisation of finance rather than by a wrong 
distribution of income and wealth for which reason they continue to prioritise structural 
changes in the financial system rather than structural changes to the current system of 
inequality. The conclusion that falls out of the above analysis is that this order of priorities 
needs to be reversed. The subprime crisis that broke out in mid-2007 was caused by the fact 
that the CDO market had grown to a size sufficient to wreak general havoc when it suddenly 
collapsed at this point in time. Economic inequality was absolutely central to the growth of 
that market. Absent the large numbers of American people who were on or below the official 
poverty line and you deprive the American banks of the raw material they needed in 
abundance to create CDOs on a mass scale; on the other side of the equation, absent the huge 
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concentration of personal wealth amongst a very few individuals and you remove a vital 
source of the pressure on the American banks to create the CDOs on that mass scale. The first 
half of this story has been well told by others. This paper has sought to fill in some of the 
gaps in the second half of the story. 
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Appendix 
When quantifying the impact of demand on bond yields all major determinants of yields 
have to be taken into account. These determinants broadly divide into three groups: those 
relating to macroeconomic essentials, those relating to financial risk (see Rudebusch et al., 
2006; Wu, 2008) and those relating to investor demand (see Bandholz et al. 2009; Craine and 
Martin 2009; Warnock and Cacdac Warnock, 2009). Accordingly, the long-term yields are 
influenced by the following factors: 
ݕ௟ ൌ ݂ሺ݅௦, ߨ, ߨ௘, ݕ௘, ݎ݌, ݀ሻ (A1) 
where yl denotes the long term interest rate, is the short-term interest rate, π current 
inflation, πe inflation expectations, ye growth expectations and rp is a risk premium for the 
expected default risk and macroeconomic and financial volatility, while d denotes investor 
demand for bonds. 
Based on (A1) Goda et al. (2011) develop four Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ARDL) 
models, to test which of these factors depressed the long-term yields of AAA-rated bonds in 
the bond yield ‘conundrum’ period. The general form of these models is: 
∆ݕ௧௟ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ∑ ߛଵ௜Δ ଵܺ௧ି௜௣௜ୀ଴ ൅ ⋯൅ ∑ ߛ௄௜Δܺ௄௧ି௜௣௜ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ߙ௜∆ݕ௧ି௜௟௣௜ୀଵ ൅ ߙ଴∆ݕ௧ିଵ௟ ൅
∑ ߚ௞ܺ௞௧ିଵ௄௞ୀଵ ൅ ݑ௧ (A2) 
The main reasons for choosing the ARDL modelling technique were that, firstly, it was 
infeasible for their purpose to use stationary vector autoregression (VAR) and vector error 
correction models (VECM) because of the large number of variables involved and the 
incorporation of lags and, secondly, most of the variables are non-stationary but some are 
stationary. It should be further noted that Goda et al. report that in each bond class a 
structural change took place during the sample period, the dates of these changes apparently 
being November 1998 in the Treasury market, February 1999 in the AAA-rated corporate 
bond market, and April 2004 in the agency and municipal bond markets. What follows are 
the models that account for these structural breaks as these are Goda et al.’s favoured models 
for inference due to their superior fit13. 
                                                
13 See Goda et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion of the model specification, model selection, and for possible 
reasons for the structural breaks and their influence on the variables. 
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Table A1. Parsimonious model of the nominal 10-year Treasury yield 
 
Note: This table summarizes the results of our ARDL-model for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield. Where ∆ is 
the difference operator, the number of lags are indicated in parentheses as a suffix to a variable’s name, s11/98 
indicates the shift component of a variable and the date of the structural break (i.e. after November 1998), 
YIELD is the 10-year nominal Treasury yield, FOROFFICIAL are foreign official holdings as a ratio of total 
outstanding long-term Treasuries, FORPRIVATE are foreign private holdings as a ratio of total outstanding 
long-term Treasuries, EURDOL is the 3-month Eurodollar rate, LOGISM is the log of the ISM-Index, PCE is 
the actual PCE inflation rate, DOW is the value of the Dow Jones Index, and MOVE is the Merrill Lynch Option 
Volatility Estimate Index. Intercepts are not reported but are included in the models. In each column coefficients 
and t-statistics (in parenthesis) are reported. Probability values for all misspecification tests are reported in the 
section headed misspecification/cointegration tests, where BG(x) denotes the probability value of the Breusch-
Godfrey test for x order correlation and Arch(x) the probability value of the ARCH heteroskedasticity test with 
x lags. The 5% critical values for the bounds cointegration test with unrestricted intercept and no trend are (i) 
F=3.39, t=-4.72, (ii) F=3.50, t=-5.03 [(i) k=8, (ii) k=10 (t), k=7 (F)] – see Pesaran et al. (2001). The significance 
of a coefficient or test statistic at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance is indicated by ***, ** and *, 
respectively (Source: Goda et al., 2011). 
 
∆(FOROFFICIAL) ‐0.2155*** (‐6.81)
∆(FOROFFICIAL(‐1)) ‐0.1325*** (‐4.11) FOROFFICIAL ‐0.0944*** (‐7.14)
∆(EUR_DOL)   0.7202***   (4.38) FORPRIVATE ‐0.2396*** (‐5.82
∆(EURDOL)s11/98 ‐0.5256*** (‐2.98) EURDOL   0.4478***   (4.50)
∆(EURDOL(‐1)) ‐0.1630* (‐1.78) LOGISM   3.3286***   (5.52)
∆(LOGISM)   1.0200***   (2.65) PCE   0.9426***   (3.72)
∆(LOGISM(‐1))   1.6376***  (2.86) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56)
∆(LOGISM(‐1))s11/98 ‐1.2539* (‐1.80) MOVE   0.0070***   (2.88)
∆(LOGISM(‐4))   0.8844***   (2.66)
∆(PCE)   0.5403***   (2.90) FOROFFICIAL ‐0.0944*** (‐7.14)
∆(PCE(‐9)) ‐0.6432*** (‐3.12) FORPRIVATE   0.0038   (0.07)
∆(DOW)   0.0001**   (3.14) EURDOL   0.1113***  (2.85)
YIELD(‐1) ‐0.3795*** (‐6.63) LOGISM   2.5283***   (3.61)
FOROFFICIAL(‐1) ‐0.0358*** (‐4.67) PCE   0.9426***   (3.72)
FORPRIVATE(‐1) ‐0.0909*** (‐6.50) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56)
FORPRIVATE(‐1)s11/98   0.0924***   (3.62) MOVE   0.0070***   (2.88)
EURDOL(‐1)   0.1700***   (3.45)
EURDOL(‐1)s11/98 ‐0.1277*** (‐2.73)
LOGISM(‐1)   1.2634***   (4.69) BG(2) prob.
LOGISM(‐1)s11/98   0.3038** (‐2.29) BG(12) prob.
PCE(‐1)   0.3578***   (3.28) Jarque‐Bera prob.
DOW(‐1)   0.0002***   (5.88) Arch(1) prob.
MOVE(‐1)   0.0027***   (2.78) Arch(12) prob.
adj. R‐squared   0.64 White prob.
Schwarz criterion ‐0.54 Ramsey LR prob.
Sample: 1994:02 to 2007:06 (161 observations) Wu‐Hausm. prob.
Bounds test F‐stat.
Bounds test t‐stat.      ‐6.63***
0.15
0.58
       8.20***
0.24
0.36
0.26
0.56
0.49
0.61
(i) model (ii) equilibrium long‐run effects
before the break
after the break
misspecification/cointegration tests
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Table A2. Parsimonious model of the nominal long term yields of AAA-rated 
non-Treasury US securities 
 
Note: This table summarizes the results of our ARDL-models for the nominal 10-year US agency, and AAA-
rated corporate and municipal bond yields, respectively. The table notes are the same as in Table A1, with the 
following exceptions: sx/x indicates the shift component of a variable with the date of the structural break 
indicated by x/x (i.e. after February 1999 and after April 2001), YIELD is the 10-year nominal yield of the 
respective bond class, FOROFFICIAL are foreign official holdings as a ratio of total outstanding bonds (i.e. the 
holdings ratio) of the respective bond class, FORPRIVATE is the foreign private holdings ratio of the respective 
bond class, FOREIGN is the foreign holdings ratio of municipal bonds, USBANK is the US banking institutions 
holdings ratio of the respective bond class, USINDIVIDUAL is the US individual holdings ratio of the respective 
bond class, USINSURANCE is the US insurance companies holdings ratio of the respective bond class, 
USPENSION is the US pension funds holdings ratio of the respective bond class, and EDFAAA is Moody’s 
expected default frequency for AAA-rated corporate bonds. The 5% critical values for a Bounds cointegration 
test with unrestricted intercept and no trend are (i) F=3.30, t≈-5.20 , (ii) F=3.39, t=-5.03, (iii) F=3.24, t≈-5.20 
[(i) k=11 (t), k=9 (F) (ii) k=10 (t), k=8 (F) (iii) k=10 (F), k=11 (t)] – see Pesaran et al. (2001) (Source: Goda et 
al., 2011). 
 
  
∆(FOROFFICIAL) ‐1.7414*** (‐5.68) ∆(YIELD(‐1))   0.0956   (1.61) ∆(YIELD(‐1))s04/01   0.4644***   (4.57)
∆(FORPRIVATE) ‐0.4600*** (‐3.45) ∆(FORPRIVATE) ‐0.3983*** (‐9.59) ∆(YIELD(‐1))s04/01   0.3334***   (3.59)
∆(USINDIVIDUALS) ‐0.1321*** (‐2.98) ∆(FORPRIVATE(‐1)) ‐0.2464*** (‐5.10) ∆(YIELD(‐3))s04/01   0.2833***   (3.22)
∆(EURDOL)   0.4803***   (3.80) ∆(US INDIVIDUAL(‐1)) ‐0.1792*** (‐5.90) ∆(YIELD(‐4))   0.2293***   (3.70)
∆(LOGISM)   1.4678***   (3.11) ∆(USBANK(‐1)) ‐0.3478*** (‐4.28) ∆(YIELD(‐5))   0.2166***   (3.62)
∆(PCE)   0.6020**   (2.50) ∆(EURDOL(‐1)) ‐0.1658*** (‐2.59) ∆(EURDOL)   0.7231***   (8.42)
∆(PCE(‐2))s04/01 ‐0.8739*** (‐2.82) ∆(EURDOL(‐8))s02/99 ‐0.3045*** (‐4.24) ∆(EURDOL(‐2))s04/01 ‐0.3469** (‐2.34)
∆(DOW)s04/01   0.0003***   (4.95) ∆(EURDOL(‐11))   0.1275**   (2.24) ∆(EURDOL(‐8))s04/01 ‐0.3734*** (‐2.87)
∆(MOVE)s04/01   0.0094***   (4.95) ∆(LOGISM)   0.6734**   (2.39) ∆(PCE)   0.9009***   (5.03)
YIELD(‐1) ‐0.4101*** (‐7.87) ∆(LOGISM(‐1))   1.5553***   (3.82) ∆(DOW)s04/01   0.0002***   (3.85)
FOROFFICIAL(‐1) ‐0.4626*** (‐3.27) ∆(LOGISM(‐1))s02/99 ‐1.4720*** (‐3.03) ∆(DOW(‐5))   0.0001***   (2.61)
FOROFFICIAL(‐1)s04/01   0.4027***   (3.32) ∆(PCE)   0.4381***   (3.29) ∆(MOVE)   0.0033***   (3.19)
FORPRIVATE(‐1) ‐0.2168*** (‐3.11) ∆(PCE(‐9)) ‐0.4191*** (‐2.91) ∆(MOVE(‐2)) ‐0.0027*** (‐2.96)
USINDIVIDUAL(‐1) ‐0.0514*** (‐3.54) ∆(DOW)   0.0001***   (3.21) YIELD10(‐1) ‐0.5913*** (‐8.75)
USPENSION(‐1)s04/01 ‐0.1441*** (‐3.07) YIELD(‐1) ‐0.2273*** (‐6.56) YIELD(‐1)s04/01 ‐0.4765*** (‐6.14)
EURDOL(‐1)   0.2218***   (5.02) FORPRIVATE(‐1) ‐0.2113*** (‐5.37) FOREIGN(‐1) ‐4.9958*** (‐6.30)
LOGISM(‐1)   1.3153***   (4.34) FORPRIVATE(‐1)s02/99   0.1615***   (4.50) FOREIGN(‐1)s04/01   4.1318***   (6.05)
PCE(‐1)   0.8260***   (6.30) EURDOL(‐1)   0.0664***   (4.83) USINDIVIDUAL(‐1) ‐0.1010*** (‐4.27)
DOW(‐1)   0.0002***   (4.53) LOGISM(‐1)   0.6125***   (3.51) USINSURANCE(‐1) ‐0.0747*** (‐2.60)
MOVE(‐1)   0.0036**   (2.24) LOGISM(‐1)s02/99 ‐0.5380*** (‐4.33) USBANK(‐1) ‐0.2470** (‐2.07)
MOVE(‐1)s04/01   0.0061***   (2.80) PCE(‐1)   0.1906***   (2.88) EURDOL(‐1)   0.2054***   (6.09)
adj. R‐squared CPI10Y(‐1)   0.3002**   (2.29) LOGISM(‐1)   0.6388***   (2.73)
Schwarz criterion DOW(‐1)   0.0001***   (5.61) PCE(‐1)   0.3050***   (3.66)
Sample: 1995:01 to 2007:06 (150 obs.) MOVE(‐1)   0.0016**   (2.34) DOW(‐1)   0.0001***   (3.71)
EDFAAA(‐1)   3.0898***   (5.60) MOVE(‐1)   0.0055***   (4.82)
adj. R‐squared adj. R‐squared 0.57
Schwarz criterion Schwarz criterion ‐0.61
Sample: 1994:02 to 2007:06 (161 obs.) Sample: 1994:02 to 2007:06 (161 obs.)
Results misspecification/cointegration tests
BG(2) prob.: (i) 0.89, (ii) 0.65, (iii) 0.23         BG(12) prob.: (i) 0.26, (ii) 0.15, (iii) 0.10         Jarque‐Bera prob.: (i) 0.44, (ii) 0.99, (iii) 0.54
‐1.19
(i) Agency (ii) Corporate
Bounds test: F‐stat. (i) 8.68***, (ii) 10.41***, (iii) 10.39***; t‐stat. (i) ‐7.87***, (ii) ‐6.56***, (iii) ‐9.85***
Arch(1) prob.: (i) 0.61, (ii) 0.86, (iii) 0.41     Arch(12) prob.: (i) 0.56, (ii) 0.15, (iii) 0.87      White prob.:  (i) 0.47, (ii) 0.31, (iii) 0.06
Ramsey LR prob.: (i) 0.16, (ii) 0.26, (iii) 0.23      Wu‐Hausman Prob.: F‐stat. (i) 0.46, (ii) 0.55, (iii) 0.86
(iii) Municipal
0.63
‐0.09
0.71
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Table A3. Equilibrium long-run impacts on the nominal long term yields of AAA-rated 
non-Treasury US securities 
 
Note: This table summarizes the equilibrium results of our ARDL-models for the nominal 10-year US agency, 
and AAA-rated corporate and municipal bond yields, respectively. The table notes are the same as in Table A1 
and Table A2 (Source: Goda et al., 2011). 
 
FOROFFICIAL ‐1.1282*** (‐3.82) FORPRIVATE ‐0.9298*** (‐5.39) FOREIGN ‐8.4493*** (‐5.64)
FORPRIVATE ‐0.5286*** (‐3.43) EURDOL   0.2923***   (5.18) USINDIVIDUAL ‐0.1709*** (‐4.33)
USINDIVIDUAL ‐0.1253*** (‐3.93) LOGISM   2.6953***   (3.24) USINSURANCE ‐0.1263*** (‐2.83)
USPENSION PCE   0.8387***   (3.15) USBANK ‐0.4178** (‐2.08)
EURDOL   0.5410***   (6.83) CPI10Y   1.3207**   (2.42) EURDOL   0.3473***   (8.47)
LOGISM   3.2074***   (4.80) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56) LOGISM   1.0805***   (3.17)
PCE   2.0143***   (7.82) MOVE   0.0071**   (2.51) PCE   0.5159***   (3.74)
DOW   0.0004***   (4.53) EDFAAA 13.5957***   (6.33) DOW   0.0002***   (3.36)
MOVE   0.0088**   (2.20) MOVE   0.0093***   (4.63)
FOROFFICIAL ‐0.1462* (‐1.73) FORPRIVATE ‐0.2193*** (‐5.63) FOREIGN ‐0.8091*** (‐7.00)
FORPRIVATE ‐0.5286*** (‐3.43) EURDOL   0.2923***   (5.18) USINDIVIDUAL ‐0.0946*** (‐5.45)
USINDIVIDUAL ‐0.1253*** (‐3.93) LOGISM   0.3282   (0.43) USINSURANCE ‐0.0699*** (‐2.92)
USPENSION ‐0.3514*** (‐3.10) PCE   0.8387***   (3.15) USBANK ‐0.2314** (‐2.18)
EURDOL   0.5410***   (6.83) CPI10Y   1.3207**   (2.42) EURDOL   0.1923***   (7.97)
LOGISM   3.2074***   (4.80) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56) LOGISM   0.5983***   (2.88)
PCE   2.0143***   (7.82) MOVE   0.0071**   (2.51) PCE   0.2857***   (3.94)
DOW   0.0004***   (4.53) EDFAAA 13.5957***   (6.33) DOW   0.0001***   (4.07)
MOVE   0.0237***   (5.91) MOVE   0.0051***   (4.58)
after the break after the break after the break
(i) Agency bond yield (ii) Corporate bond yield (iii) Municipal bond yield
before the break before the break before the break
